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Within a small open economy fair wage model with unemployment of unskilled workers, we show that 
exogenous unskilled immigration increases the welfare of natives if the elasticity of the inverse labour 
demands exceeds a positive finite threshold. This threshold depends positively on the displacement ratio 
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1.  Introduction 
2.  The Model 
3.  Conclusion Non-Technical Summary  
In a small open economy framework that features unemployment of unskilled labour, we examine the 
effect of unskilled immigration on employment of natives and on native welfare. We show that an 
exogenous immigration of unskilled workers reduces the employment of unskilled natives. The overall 
effect of immigration on the welfare of natives is ambiguous: On the positive side, immigration reduces the 
wage payments to existing migrants (thereby generating an immigration surplus for the suppliers of 
domestic factors other than unskilled labour), but on the negative side the employment of unskilled native 
workers falls. We provide an easily estimable formula that can be used to determine whether or not 
immigration increases the welfare of natives. It shows that immigration increases the welfare of natives if 
the elasticity of the inverse labour demand exceeds a finite threshold. 1 Introduction
In models with full employment but without taxes and income transfers, the literature
on international migration, when migrants possess only labour, has shown that marginal
immigration has no welfare eﬀects on natives in the host country while ﬁnite immigration
increases their welfare (see Berry and Soligo, 1969). Welfare of natives increases since
the inﬂow of new immigrants reduces the wage payments to the inframarginal migrants,
resulting in the immigration surplus. There are many studies that have estimated the eco-
nomic beneﬁts of immigration. Borjas (1995), for example, using data for USA, estimated
economic beneﬁts from immigration between $7 and $25 billion, annually.1
Measuring the welfare eﬀect of migration in the host country by the immigration sur-
plus relies on a framework in which the employment of native workers remains unaﬀected,
typically because it is assumed that they are fully employed. On the other hand, job
displacement of native workers by immigrants is a possibility if unemployment in the host
country exists. In this paper, we develop a simple model of a small open economy that
features involuntary unemployment of unskilled workers and examine the eﬀect of exoge-
nous unskilled immigration on the welfare of natives. We ﬁnd that in this case the welfare
eﬀect of immigration is ambiguous, as it is now jointly determined by the immigration
surplus and the induced employment eﬀect of natives. We derive an easily interpretable
formula to determine the sign of the overall welfare eﬀect.
2 The Model
Consider a small open economy producing a number of traded goods using unskilled labour
l, skilled labour h and other factors of production. It is assumed that the number of factors
exceeds the number of goods and thus changes in factor supplies aﬀect factor rewards.
Commodity trade is free so that domestic and world goods prices are equal. The supply
1An exogenous immigration, however, can reduce the welfare of natives in economies where income
taxes and transfers exists (e.g., Michael (2003) or in large and technologically superior countries where
immigration may cause a terms of trade deterioration (e.g., Davis and Weinstein (2002)).
1side of the economy is described by a standard GDP function G(l,h), where goods prices
and factors other than labour are suppressed as arguments of G(·) as they are held constant
throughout. In labour market equilibrium, the wage for both types of labour has to equal
the respective value marginal product, i.e. w = Gl and r = Gh.2 Furthermore, we make
the standard assumptions Gll,Ghh < 0 (i.e. demand curves for both types of labour are
downward sloping) and Ghl > 0 (both types of labour are complements in production).
Both types of workers are able to choose their eﬀort at work. Following Akerlof and
Yellen (1990) and Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) we assume that the eﬀort is determined
according to el = min(w/w∗,1) and eh = min(r/r∗,1), respectively, where a ”*” denotes
the respective fair wage, i.e. the standard of reference that workers use in order to assess
whether they are paid fairly. For each of the two groups, the fair wage has two determi-
nants: ﬁrst the market wage of the respective other group, and second the remuneration
they could expect outside their current job, taking into account that they might be un-
employed with a probability that is equal to the factor-speciﬁc rate of unemployment:
w∗ = θr + (1 − θ)(1 − ul)w (1)
r∗ = θw + (1 − θ)(1 − uh)r (2)
where ui is the unemployment rate for labour of type i. Firms are wage setters, but
treat the fair wage, which is determined in general equilibrium, parametrically. As eﬀort
decreases proportionally if ﬁrms pay less than the fair wage, they have no incentive to
do so, and hence el = eh = 1 in equilibrium. Under the assumption that a competitive
equilibrium would be characterized by r > w, eq. (2) is never binding and h is fully
employed in equilibrium. On the other hand, there is unemployment of l. We therefore
have to distinguish between (unskilled) labour endowment ¯ l and employment l, and the
unemployment rate for unskilled labour is given by u = (¯ l − l)/¯ l. Setting w∗ = w in eq.
(1) and solving for w yields
F(r,l,¯ l) ≡ w =
θr¯ l
¯ l − (1 − θ)l
(3)
2Indices are used throughout to denote partial derivatives.
2with Fr,Fl > 0 and F¯ l < 0. In analogy to Akerlof and Yellen (1990), eq. (3) is called the
fair wage constraint.
We are now in a position to derive the eﬀect of immigration of unskilled workers (d¯ l > 0)
on aggregate employment (dl). Totally diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition for the
unskilled labour market F(Gh(l,h),l,¯ l) = Gl(l,h), holding constant the endowment of
skilled labour, gives




= −(Fl + FrGhl − Gll)
−1 F¯ l (5)
This results in:
Proposition 1. With equal unemployment rates among migrants and natives, unskilled
immigration reduces native employment.
Proof. Diﬀerentiate the fair wage constraint to get −(Fl)−1F¯ l = l/¯ l = 1 − u. Using
FrGhl − Gll > 0, this implies 0 < dl/d¯ l < 1 − u. Hence, employment increases less than
proportionally with immigration and therefore the rate of unemployment increases.
That is, immigration adds jobs to the economy, but not enough to keep the employment
of natives constant.
We now turn to analysing the welfare eﬀect of marginal immigration. To this end,
suppose that in the initial equilibrium there are two types of unskilled workers, natives ln
and an existing stock of migrants lm.3 The expenditure function for a worker of type i is
given by Ei(ui), which gives the minimum expenditure by a worker of type i to achieve
utility ui.4 Ownership of the factors of production other than labour is distributed between
3Note that this setup generates the marginal variant of the standard immigration surplus. As in the
case of ﬁnite immigration, the surplus stems from the induced wage eﬀect of inframarginal migrants (l
m
in the present model). See Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) for a discussion in the full employment case.
4Goods prices are constant throughout, and hence are suppressed as an argument of E
i(·). Furthermore,
as shown above, all workers supply full eﬀort in equilibrium, and hence individual eﬀort can be ignored as
an argument of E
i(·).
3natives (skilled and unskilled). The budget constraint of the economy then becomes
lnEn(un) + hEh(uh) = G(h,l) − lmEm(um), (6)
assuming for simplicity that unemployment beneﬁts are zero. The expenditure of natives
on the left hand side of (6) equals the diﬀerence between the value of production and
the expenditure of the existing stock of migrants. Totally diﬀerentiating (6) and using
dl = dlm + dln gives
dW = Gl(dlm + dln) − lmEm
u dum − Emdlm (7)
where the change in the expenditure of natives dW ≡ lnEn
udun + lhEh
uduh + Endln is our
welfare measure. For migrants supplying labour is the only source of income, and therefore
Em = Gl and Em
u dum = Glldl. Substituting into (7) leads to our central equation for the











The ﬁrst term is the change in native income induced by a change in the employment
of natives, while the second term is minus the change in income of the existing stock of
migrants induced by a change in their wage rate. The ﬁrst term is negative while the
second term (including the minus) is positive.
In order to say something about the relative size of both eﬀects, we write Rdlm =
−dln, where R is the displacement ratio, i.e. the number of natives who lose their job
relative to the number of immigrants who ﬁnd employment. From proposition 1, we know
0 < R < 1 and hence in the fair wage model there is partial displacement of native
workers by migrants. The relation between the change in aggregate employment and




















4where ε ≡ −Glll/Gl > 0 is the elasticity of the inverse labour demand curve (in absolute
value), and φ ≡ lm/l is the share of the existing stock of migrants in the unskilled working
population. As we know dln/d¯ l < 0, the condition for immigration to be welfare improving
is





Proposition 2. With an existing stock of migrants and partial job displacement of na-
tives by foreigners, marginal immigration of unskilled workers increases native welfare if
the elasticity of the inverse labour demand curve exceeds some strictly positive but ﬁnite
threshold level ¯ ε. This threshold depends positively on the displacement ratio R and nega-
tively on φ, the share of the existing stock of migrants in the unskilled working population.
Ceteris paribus, a higher elasticity of the inverse labour demand curve leads to a larger
wage eﬀect of immigration, and hence to a larger loss for migrants already in the country,
thereby beneﬁting natives. The eﬀects of φ and R are very intuitive as well. Ceteris
paribus, ¯ ε is small if the share of existing immigrants is large (i.e. φ is large) and thus the
gains to natives due to the wage decrease are larger. Similarly, ¯ ε is small if the displacement
ratio is small and thus fewer native workers loose their job due to immigration. For
example, if R = 0.1 and φ = 0.1 immigration increases the welfare of natives if the elasticity
of the inverse demand is higher than 1.11. In the extreme case of full displacement, (R → 1,
e.g. in the minimum wage model) the right hand side in (10) goes towards inﬁnity, and
hence the inequality can never hold. Without displacement (R = 0, e.g. in the full
employment model), the inequality always holds as long as φ > 0. This is the marginal
variant of the standard immigration surplus, as described in Felbermayr and Kohler (2007).
3 Conclusion
In a small open economy framework that features unemployment of unskilled labour, we
examine the eﬀect of unskilled immigration on employment of natives and on native wel-
fare. We show that an exogenous immigration of unskilled workers reduces the employment
5of unskilled natives. Immigration aﬀects positively the welfare of natives by reducing the
wage payments to existing immigrants (immigration surplus) and negatively by decreasing
employment of unskilled native workers, making the total eﬀect on natives’ welfare am-
biguous. We provide, however, an easily estimable formula which can be used to examine
whether or not immigration increases the welfare of natives. It shows that immigration
increases the welfare of natives if the elasticity of the inverse labour demand exceeds a
positive ﬁnite threshold.
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